e. Weapons. Majority of the incidents involved the perpetrators armed with knives and firearms (such as guns, handguns, pistols). Of the 12 incidents, eight reported that the perpetrators were armed with knives and firearms. Notably, there was no report of the firearms being discharged.
f. Treatment of Crew.In most of the incidents, the crew was tied and locked in the mess room or engine control room when the perpetrators steered the vessel to the South China Sea to carry out siphoning. The crew was not injured in most of the incidents except for minor injury sustained by the crew in two incidents; namely onboard Sri Phangnga and Sunrise 689.
g. Action by the Crew. Of the 12 incidents, SSAS was activated in four incidents, of which the maritime enforcement agencies responded to three incidents, namely Ai Maru on 14 Jun 14 (where six warships from Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore were deployed), Oriental Glory on 16 Jul 14 (where KD Trengganu from the Royal Malaysian Navy was deployed), and Suratchanya on 15 Oct 14 (where three vessels from the Indonesian Navy were reportedly deployed).
Organised Crime and Syndicates
It is assessed that there were at least three organised groups involved in the siphoning based upon the location of siphoning and the perpetrators' MO.
One group operating in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (SOMS) region, which is relatively less violent and not very successful - probably due to patrolling by the littoral States and joint coordinated patrols. The groups thought to be operating in the South China Sea (SCS) were likely equipped with more 'seaworthy' vessels due the prevailing sea state/condition in the SCS. Until substantiated by further input, ReCAAP assesses that one group, possibly with Indochina connections, had been active in the area, deploying larger number of perpetrators and targeting larger tankers, including Budi Mesra Dua, Sunrise 689 and Oriental Glory.
Syndicates are most likely to be involved, which is supported by the recent arrest made by the Singapore Police Coast Guard in Sept 2014 where a total of 53 men were arrested for involvement in illegal ship fuel trade. Most of these cases were considered 'insider-job' as it involved crew who siphoned fuel/oil from their own vessel. The initial investigation revealed that syndicates were behind the crime with mastermind and middlemen serving as the go-between for 'sellers' and 'buyers'.
In incidents where the perpetrators boarded and steered the vessels from one location to another in order to conduct siphoning to another vessel, syndicates and organised groups would need to have a good knowledge, or insider information, of the type of manifest onboard the victim vessel, the vessel's route, type of siphoning equipment onboard to facilitate the siphoning process, preferred location to enable the siphoning whilst avoiding detection by authorities, the scheduling of another vessel to come alongside the victim vessel at a specific time and location, storage of, and location to transfer, the stolen fuel/oil to potential buyers. The group would also need to understand the 'market' demand, including the type, grade and the 'market price' of the siphoned fuel/oil.
ReCAAP, in consultation with shipping companies, was informed that some groups have connections with, and belong to, well-organised syndicates which sell illegally siphoned fuel/oil, or employ middlemen as distribution channels, either a wholesaler or retailer themselves, to sell the stolen cargo. Networking and word of mouth are the means of linkage between buyers and sellers for cheaper bunkers, not ruling out transnational organised syndicates involvement.
In such operations, precise planning and coordination are essential. Good information networks are key. However, two incidents indicate that the 'wrong' vessels were boarded.
The incident involving New Glory (25 May), the perpetrators left the tanker after searching the cargo and realising that the vessel carried hot asphalt instead of diesel. Consequently, they took crew cash, personal belongings and then damaged communication equipment before leaving. A similar scenario occurred onboard VP Asphalt 2 (7 Dec), also carrying asphalt. Unfortunately, the Third Engineer sustained a shot to the head, discovered by the Master after the perpetrators had left the vessel.
Of note, several victim vessels' last port of call was Singapore. Of the 12 incidents, 8 vessels departed Singapore port. ReCAAP assessed that the perpetrators targeted vessels loaded with fuel/oil from Singapore refineries, which are believed to produce better quality and grade of fuel/oil.
Suspected Conspiracy
As some companies' vessels had been boarded and robbed one after another - Ai Maru, Naninwa Maru No.1, Moresby 9; and Danai 4, Orapin 4 and Orapin 2, conspiracy between perpetrators and ship's crew cannot be ruled out. Closer look at the Naniwa Maru No.1 incident, where the Master, Chief Office and Chief Engineer, left the tanker with the perpetrators, taking their personal belongings and travel documents. Opportunely, the company also failed to contact the crews' families after the incident.
Two vessels had been boarded more than once in the last two years.
Honduras-registered tanker, Ai Maru, had been boarded 5 Jun 2012 by 6 pirates in the vicinity approx 30nm off Horsburgh Lighthouse, SCS. The pirates took control of the tanker but left when they noticed a small aircraft hovering overhead in the vicinity. Two years later, 14 Jun 2014, Ai Maru was again boarded with pirates able to successfully siphon 40% of the Marine Gas Oil (MGO) cargo carried.
The other tanker targeted more than once was Honduras-registered product tanker, Moresby 9, boarded 17 Aug 2013 and 4 Jun 2014.
Also highlighted by Ship Technology, quoting OCEANUSLive.
Implications
The majority of incidents targeted MGO which is relatively costly and consequently in greater demand. Other fuel/oil types targeted were Marine Diesel Oil (MDO), Automative Diesel Fuel (ADF), Marine Fuel Oil (MFO), Diesel and Lube Oil.
Due to the market price and taxes imposed on fuel/oil, illegal siphoning has become a lucrative business. The demand in underground markets indicated that siphoning attempts will continue, says ReCAAP. As such, littoral States and the shipping industry are urged to adopt a more "concrete and robust response" to address the problem collectively. A drop in the price of oil is likely to bring about a decline in its market price, however, it remains to be seen whether this will dampen demand in the underground markets.
ReCAAP points out that illegal selling of fuel/oil, in pursuit of greater profit margins by those who may compromise on the quality of the fuel/oil, to buyers seeking cheaper fuel/oil who in turn may not be too concerned about the inferior grade fuel/oil that may adversely affect vessel engines, resulting in possible pollution or environmental concerns that may arise in the vent of a collision of oil spill.
Risk Assessments